brity with the young, and seemed never so happy when four or five of them were chambering about me person taking and vedeling uncertained theries to turn. Like the Apostle Paul's charity, he was "casely persuaded," and you had rarely to ask hom more than see to tell one of his infinitable accodors, or take down the violin from the closet on a ratay day, or perform his duet with Watch, the overgrown lible dog. If a poor and promising young man in the parash was cashous of a liberal equantion, Mr. Pesbody's parse was open for his assistance, with a very distant and preserious chance of being repaid. His hospitality was negroding to the nimest extent of the Apostolic and N.w Trasment standard. Not a day passed that some weice me admitton faded of being made to our abrady crowded table. The parishmer coming to return his book to the social library, the old, familiar acquaintance; the professed old acquaintance, too, whom the hert was sometimes puzzled to recognize; the traveling brother minister, stopping, with his horse, for a week or two, the passing betated stranger, too tar from the tavern for his dimer—all were our duily invited to partake of the fare for the day. The very doors of the manson were left unfustened at hight—as, indeed, they so reely needed looks in that civily invited to partisks of the fare for the day. The very doors of the mansion were left unfustened at hight—as, indeed, they sourcely needed looks in that princitive society—and many a Winter traveler from Vermont and Upper New Hampshire, going down in his leaded sleigh to the markels on the sentented, has come is to warm himself by the midnight bed of embers, held long and pleasant conversations with Mr. Peabody as he lay in an adjoining bedoom, and then retreed—the parties being destined never to see or imagine each other's appearance, or to hear each other's voice again.

Peabody as he my in an anjuncture of the parties being destined never to see or imagine each other's uppearance, or to hear each other's voice again.

The titles by which he was designated among his acquait tances were various, according to the degrees of effection, or respect, or indifference with which as was regarded. By some he was regarded. By some he was called "Priest Peabody," by others "Parson Peabody," by others "the Reverend Mister," by others again plain "Mister Peabody," but from all the family, and from all of those who were more or less intimately connected with or attached to him, he received the endearing appellation of "Sir Peabody."

Methinks I see his form even now, as it impressed itself on my youthful imagination, looming after off in the road, on the hill-top, against the sky. He may be going to pay some very format viell. As he deed not the all with as animated and vigorous, on not harried pace, I discern more distinctly his claborate and imposing elicities dress his high, three-connected betwee hat—his large, single breasted cost, sweeping down on each side with an acapte curve—his vest, "fall twice the length of these degenerate days," ending on both sides with large pock is and supert—his snow-white, plaited stock, under a smeath, shaven, expanded chin, and fastened behind with a silver brackle—his new-white, plaited stock, under a resolul, shaven, expanded chin, and fastened behind with a silver brackle—his bog, black rik stockings extensing from the knee to the fost—the whole he mg finished and consummated by shuing, some re-backled shoes. He draws dill neater, and with something of the old, erect, military air which he fost—the whole he mg finished and consummated by shuing, some re-backled shoes. He draws dill neater, and with something of the man of the world, and more palmy regilections of him, as age advanced, and a hearty "Good day," and passes on.

This, however, belongs to my cardier and more palmy regilections of him. As age advanced, and means perhaps were straitened, and

The however, bejongs to my earlier and more palmy regifications of him. As age advanced, and means perhaps were straitened, and post Revolutionary fashions prevailed, his dress and appearance, even in his hest array, became less picturesque, aristocratic and awe-inspiring. Sitk would now give way to worsted, and the shoe-backle be replaced by the plain galloon or plainer leathern string.

But far more astouding the change exhibited, even at the former brilliant period, by the very same incinvidual, when engrossed by the labors of some busy season of the year—bolding perhaps the plough; or being the corn-field until toe latest shade of twilight; or urging forward the various processes of haymaking; or trafting his trees; or gathering in the autumnal harvest; or pressing out his years stock of eider from immense apple-heaps; or shaking and gleaning the apple-trees, all of which he mounted for that purpose hunself; or laying up the choicest kines of truit in his extensive apple-cellar, to bring them out every day through the Winter with profuse and hospitable pinde; or butchering a beeve, or butchering a swine—operations, every detail of which he executed with artistic dexterity, though I imagine be was the only butcher who never sacrificed lands without repeating aloud to himself or to the which he executed with attack when never sharpfixed a lamb without repeating about to himself or to the by-standers those four lines of Pope:

"The lamb thy not cooms to bleed to-day,
Had he thy reason, which he skep and play i
Pleased to the last he crops the flowery food,
And licks the hand just raised to shed his blood."

Amidtolls like these came forth the large flapped, weather-etained, round, and low-crowned hat, which had commenced its brighter days of service in a very and commenced its orighter days of service in a very different shape some dozen years before—the unshaven face, neglected, at some very busy periods, from one Sabbath morning to another—and the old service-beaten gown tied up about the waist, or probably no upper partners at all save the realisms. ent at all save the reeking shirt that covered

workman or two, and a small apprentice-boy, he car-ried on the operations of his farm alone. The whole fael for several fires in the house, through the long Northern Winter, was often chopped and supplied by his stalwart arm alone. A prominent place in the volume is given to an

examination of the philosophy of Dr. Thomas Brown, which, we think, would have been better occupied with articles of a more popular character, affording larger occasion for the exercise of the culiar talent of the author, which is evidently that of humorous description. So far from the works of Professor Brown being destined to a higher rank among the productions of the nineteenth century than they have as yet generally assumed, as Dr. Gilman intimates, we believe that they have already passed to an oblivion from which they will never emerge.

WAPOLEON I. DELINEATED BY HIMSELF. THE CONFIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE OF NAPO-LEON BONAPARTE WITH HIS BROTHER JO-BEPH, SOMETIME KING OF SCAIN. 2 vols. 12mo. New-York: D. Appleton & Co.

[SECOND ARTICLE.]

In a former article we have made manifest, by a series of extracts from Napoleon's own letters, the purely selfish considerations by which, in the matter of the seizure of Naples, Napoleon was govsened, and the purely tyrannical maxims which he hid down for Joseph's guidance in forcing himself into that throne.

We now proceed to complete this portrait of Nasoleon, as drawn by himself, in a second series of extracts, in which Napoleon very freely expresses himself upon the true character of Joseph's poaition as King of Naples, and the means which must

be used to maintain himself in it.

How A CONQUERED COUNTRY IS TO BE HELD.

Malmaison, April 11, 1806.—MY BROTHER: You must not disguise from yourself that you will have real possession of the Kingdom of Naples only in so far as you establish there a great number of Freuch. That can only be done by giving to some of them land, and no others employment, especially in the army and by entrusting them with the command of towns, and of military stations, and of fortresses. I see no reason, therefore, why you should be in a harry to form Neapolitan regiments, or to call for the services in your army of Neapolitan officers, who will never be really to be depended upon.

INSTIGATIONS TO A NEW SORT OF ROBBERY.

Malmaison, April 11, 1806.—MY BROTHER: Confissate all ships in the ports of Naples bearing the flug of the Ionian Republic, and districts all the Commaissioners of that Republic who are in your kingdom. Have a skillful scarch made into the books of the merchanis who have bronsactions in money for the Russians and Ionians, and search that mancy. With a little address this operation ought to yield you seceral millions.

BOW TO TREAT VILLAGES THAY REVOLT.

St. Cloud, April 21, 1806.—MY BROTHER: I am glad to see that a village of the insurgents has been burnt. Severe examples are necessary. I presume that the soldiers have been allowed to plunder this village. This is the way to treat villages which revolt. It is one of the rights of war; but it is also a duty prescribed by policy. [That seems to have been Napoleon's only idea of duty—"a duty prescribed by policy."]

FROTOSED ORDER OF DELIVERANCE.

St. Cloud, May 21, 1806.—I have already begun to quarrel with the piratical States on the subject of your kingdom. Sconer or later we must make an end of them. There are more than eight thousand of your subjects between the two regrecies. I have sent to them already some assistance, but I do not intend to allow your people to be made slaves.

It is impossible to set them free without paying for it, as I set the example at be used to maintain himself in it. HOW A CONQUERED COUNTRY IS TO BE HELD.

is impossible to set them free without paying for it, as I set the example at Genos. If you resumed the estates which belonged to the Order of Malta and gave them to an Order founded for this purpose, which you may call the "Order of Deliverance," or by some other name, they would be returned to their original purpose. This order would be well received in your country and thought an honorable distinction in Eu-

eustomed them to interfere with what I do.

A CONQUERON ON CONQUERT.

(Some letter.)—I advise you again not to be intoxicated by the demonstrations of the Neapolitans.

Joseph had represented the Neapolitans as attached to his government and person.] Conquest produces on every people the same effect that it now does upon them. They seem favorable to you because the opposite perty is shent, but as soon as the continent is troubled, when the 40,000 French cavalry, infantry and artillery now in the kingdom are reduced to a few thousands, and the news is spread that I have been beaten on the Isonzo, and that Venice is abandoned, you will see what will become of this fine attachment. And how could it be otherwise? What have you done for them? What knowledge have you of them? They are the power of France, and they think that because you are appointed King of Naples all is settled, because fate has ordered it, because it is new, and because there is no belp for it.

All conquered countries put on the same appearance, disguising their sentiments and their habits, and prostrating themselves with respect before him who holds their fortunes and their lives in his hand.

LOOK OUT YOU FOLSON OR ASSASSINATION. A CONQUEROR ON CONQUEST.

with respect before him who holds their fortunes and their lives in his hand.

LOOK OUT FOR POISON OR ASSASSINATION.

St. Cloud, May 31, 1806.—MY BROTHER: Do not organize your guard so as to be under the control of a simple commander; nothing can be more dangerous.

"I have told you sheady, and I repeat it, that you place too much confidence in the Neapolitans. I say this especially with respect to your kitchen and the guards of your person: lest you should be poisoned or assassivated. I make a point that you keep your French cooks; that you have your table attended by your own servants, and that your household be so arranged that you may be always guarded by Frenchmen. You have not been sufficiently acquained with my private life to know how much, even in France, I have always frept myself under the guard of my most trusty and oldest soudiers. No one should enter your room making the night except your sid-le-camp, who sho all sieep in the chamber that precedes your bedreom. Your door should be fastened inside, and you could not to gen it even to your sid de-camp till you room. Your door should be fastened inside, and you could not to gen it even to your aid decamp till you have recognised his voice; he himself should not knock at your door till he has locked that of the room he is no make sure of being alone, and of being followed by no one. These precautions are important; they give no trouble, and the result is that they inspire conficence; beside that they may really save your life.

give no trouble, and the result is that they inspire considered; beside that they may really save your life.

THE MODERS MACHIATELLE.

St. Cloud, June 3, 1806.—MY BROTHER: I could not put M. Ros deter's speech [in behalf of the French Senate, congratulating Joseph on his accession to the three of Naples] in the Monticar, because in truth it is none nee. He speaks in the name of the Senate as he would on a newspaper article. He compares me to Machiatelli. I never saw a speech with so little in the first gin it, and on an occasion when so many good daings might have been said. I also see some passages in your speech which you must allow me to think ill-judged. You compare the altochment of the French to my person to that of the Neopolitans for you: that looks had a satire. What have for you can a people have for whe in you have done nothing?—whom you govern by right of conquest with forty or fifty thousand foreignests?

I feel you had no French army, and the late King of Naples no English one, which would be the stranger in Naples? I certainly am not in want of a foreign army to keep me in Paris. I am sorry to see in your letters that you are captivated by particular services. To be emptivated is very dangerous. The Neapolians behave we i; there is nothing extraordinary in that: you have treated them kindly; they expected ware at the hands of a man who was at the head of an army of fifty thousand men. Your disposition is mild ard temperate; you have a good understanding, and you are appreciated; but this is very far from a national feeling, from a submission and attachment founded on reason and interest. These distinctions ought not to escape you. I do not know why I tell you these things, for they will certainty annoy you. What I want is that your acts and your character.

The above letter is a specimen of Napoleon's

The above letter is a specimen of Napoleon's share in a controversy kept up between him and Joseph so long as the latter played the part of king. Joseph was naturally of a very amiable and benevolent disposition, but like many weak men of that character be allowed himself to be made the agent of atrocious designs and cruel acts. He consented to suffer himself to be forced first upon the throne of Naples and afterward on that of Spain, evidently with the benevolent intention of ruling those countries much more mildly as well as wisely than their Bourbon sovereigns had done, and with the absurd imagination that, having aggrieved the national feeling of those countries in snatching the sovereignty, he would be able to hold it by the affection of the people obtained by a mild and paternal rule. Napoleon had too much sense to give in in the least to this absurd delusion. He insisted that Joseph's acts should be suitable to his character. He gave him to understand very plainly that being nothing more nor less than a tyrant and usurper, whose throne rested on foreign bayonets, it was not for him to affect to play the paternal menarch.

paternal menarch.

MARSHAL JOURDAN.

St. Cloud, June 3, 1806.—I know Marshal Jourdan well; you should attach him to your person; he is experienced, moderate, active and devoted. I know no man more fit for the government of Naples (the City of Naples); for you must have one on whom you can entirely depend, and who will watch the town, which the recommendate, as it is no your marking from is the nore impositant, as it is on your maritime fron-tier. He will receive the revenues of the dutchy which I shall give him [he got none, however,] from among those which I have reserved for myself in the Kingdom of Naples. You should add to it a good salary as Governor, so as to give him a great position in the country. Jourdan and Reynier are the two men whose services you should secure.

Whose services you should seeder.

(Same letter.)—Massena is good for nothing as a civilian, he is incapable of attachment. He is a good soldier, but entirely devoted to money; it is the sole motive of his conduct and his only incitement to action, even when under my eye. At first he covered only small sume; but now thousands of millions would not ratisfy him. ROBBING PETER TO PAY-TALLEYRAND AND BAR-

ROBBING PETER TO PAY—TALLEYRAND AND BARNABOTTE.

St. Cloud, June 3, 1806, 11 a. m.—MY BROTHER:
The conduct of the Court of Rome bears the stamp of
madness. I wished with the first stroke to make them
feel all that they had to fear from me; and besides, I
thought that under any circumstances the insulated
Papal territories of Benevento and Ponte Corvo could
not tail to be troublesome to your Kingdom. I have
made them into two duchies; that of Benevento for
Talleyrand, that of Ponte Corvo for Bernadotte. I
know that these Provinces are poor: but Talleyrand is Talleyrand, that of Ponte Corvo for Bernadotte. I know that these Provinces are poor; but Talleyrand is rich, and I will make Bernadotte's Duchy worth having. You must be aware that I give the titles of duke and prince to Bernadotte for your wife's sake, for I have in my army Generals who have served me better, and on whose attachment I have more reason to rely. But I thought that it was proper that the brother-in-law of the Queen of Naples should have a distinguished position in your Kingdom.

brother-in-law of the Queen of Naples should have a distinguished position in your Kingdom.

THE THIEF AND THE HONEST MAN ON A LEVEL.
(Same letter.)—As to the other six Duchies, I shall be able to bestow them without difficulty. Both Massena and Jourdan would do. Every blot disappears in time, and the names of the conqueror at Fleurus and the conqueror at Zurich will live, and will be all that will be remembered in the time of their children.

THE INTERIAL FOLICY.
(Same letter.)—Tell me what titles you would give to the Duchies in your Kingdom. The titles are not so important as the property attached to them. Each should have 200,000 frames a year. I have required also that the owners of the titles should have a residence in Paris, for the center of the whole system is

dence in Paris, for the center of the whole system is there. I intend to have in Paris one hundred for-tunes—all of them having grown up with the throne,

unes—all of them having grown up with the throne, and alone press rved by entails—winle all other fortunes will be split into fragments by our law of inheritance.

WHY SAPOLYON ESTABLISHED THE CIVIL CODE.

(Same letter.)—Establish our Civil Code in Naples.

By that means all the fortunes which you do not preserve will disappear in a few years. Thus is the great advantage of our Civil Code.

It will consolidate your power, since by means of it all that is not entailed is broken up, and there remain no other great families than those which you endow with defs. It is this which always made me like the Civil Code, and which determined me to establish it.

It is this which always made me like the Civil Code, and which determined me to establish it.

St. Cloud, May 19, 1806.—The business with Holland is settled, and before long Louis will be King of Helland. He is willing, but his health continues to be indifferent.

June 3.—In an hour I am to receive the Tarkish Embassador, proclaim Frince Louis King of Helland.

the kind. I anderstand that you wash for something of the kind. I anderstand that you wash for something of the kind. I with more so than the defense of the street, and this order would be at the same time respicus and political. I write without having reflected; this idea requires to be matured.

Mar As IN LITERATURE EACH MAN HAS HIS OWN STYLE.

**St. Clovd, June 6, 1806.—Marshal Jourdan is more fit to command troops in the interior than Marshal Massens, who, on the other hand, is much more capable of helping you to take Sicily by a coup-de-main. To command that it is my command, I hope that they will have the goodness to approve it. I have not accustomed them to interfere with what I do.

A CONQUEROR ON CONQUEST. St. Clovd., June 6, 1806.—Marchal Jourdan is more fit to command troops in the interior than Marchal Massens, who, on the other hand, is much more capable of helping you to take Sicily by a coup-de-main. To command the nine thousand men who are to land first in Sicily you want a man of determined character who has mixed in great events. Gen. Verdier would do perhaps better than Reynier; if you do not appoint Massens, send them both. In war as in literature each man has his own style. For shorp and prolonged attacks requiring great boldness, Massens would do better than Keynier. To protect the kingdom against invasion in your absence, Jourdan is preferable to Massens.

invasion in your absence, Jourdan is preferable to Massens.

Kamtonillet, Aug. 20, 1806.—It would be well if you could attach Massena, for though he has not great military talents, you may want him as a man of energy.

A GOOD CATHOLIC MAY FIGHT THE FOFE.

St. Cloud, June 22, 1806.—My Brother: The court of Rome has gone quite mad. They refuse to acknowledge you, and I know not what sort of a treaty they wish to make with me. They think that I cannot reconcile a great respect for the spiritual auliority of the Pope with the repression of his pretensions to temporal dominion. They forget that St. Louis, whose piety is midoubted, was almost always at war with the Pope, and that Charles V., who was an eminently Christian prince, long bessiged Rome and ended by taking possession of both that city and the States of the Church.

taking possession of both that city and the States of the Church.

FRANCE A SLAVE FLANTATION.

St. Clend, June 24, 1806.—Roederer, (one of Joseph's Ministers) wants also to carry off our actors, and upon which of them do you think he casts his eyes! Only upon Fleury and Talma. I know it because they have declared that they could not listen to his applications without being authorized. M. Roederer then is not aware that none of my subjects can leave France without my permission, and it is not by attempts to seduce them that they will be obtained.

attempts to seduce them that they will be obtained.

MASTERSHIP OF THE MEDITERRANEAN.

St. Cloud, July 21, 1806.—We are still negotiating with England. Sicily continues to be the stambling-block. 10 o'clock p. m.—A courier who has just arrived from London makes me think that the English are astonished by this decision of Russia, the treaty of Oubril which Alexander refused to ratify because it was signed against his instructions.] and that they are somewhat inclined to give up Sicily, which till now has been the stumbling-block. If these suppositions are confirmed you will have the finest kingdom in the world, and I hope that by setting to work earnestly to form a good army and fleet you will assist me to become master of the Mediterranean, which is the chief and perpetual aim of my policy. For that it is requisite to obtain large sums from the people. Naples and Sicily ought to yield you 100 millions; Italy and France pay me more in proportion. You should have six vessels of the line, nine frigates, and ten brigs; and you ought to keep up an army of forty thousand men. Fresch and Neapolitan. Keep, however, these bints to yourself just now, for it is possible that the project may fail, and I would rather have len years of war than allow your kingdom to remain incomplete and Sicily in dispute.

may fail, and I would rather have the gent of war than allow your kingdom to remain incomplete and Sicily in dispute.

THE ART OF WAR.

July 28, 1806.—All the art of war consists in a well-arranged and extremely circumspect defensive, and a bold and rapid offensive.

July 30.—To succeed one must be sometimes very bold and sometimes very prudent.

July 13.—You have consts to defend, it is true, but so have I in every direction; and if it were the fact that their ships gave such an advantage to the English, it would follow that with their fifty thousand disposable men they might hold in check a much greater number of my troops; but for everything you must have a plan. I told you long ago that you disporse your troops too much. Keep them assembled, and you will experience what has happened in France: the English have often landed, but they have been well beaten, and they no longer venture to disembark.

St. Cloud, Aug. 9.—The art of distributing troops is the great art of war. Place them always in such a manner, that whatever the enemy may do, you may be able to are your forces united within a few days.

St. Cloud, Aug. 16, 1806.—Success in war is not betained by having a great many troops, but by their

St. Cloud, Aug. 16, 1806.—Success in war is not obtained by having a great many troops, but by their being well organized and well disciplined.

being well organized and well disciplined.

HOW TO STRENGTHEN A THRONE.

Bear in mind what I tell you; the fate of your reign depends on your conduct when you return from Calabia [Calabia was in arms against Joseph.] Grant no pardons; do military execution on at least six hundred rebels; they have murdered a great many of my soldiers. Let the houses of thirty of the principal heads of villages be bunt, and distribute their property among the troops. Disarm all the inhabitants and pillage five or six of the large villages which have behaved worst. Desire the soldiers to treat well the towns which have remained faithful. Confiscate the public property of the revolted villages, and give it to the army; above all, disarm rigorously.

On my return from the grand army, Placentia rebelled; I sent thither Junot, who sent me reports full of French eleverness, and declared that no rebellion had taken place. I ordered him to burn two villages and to shoot the ringleaders, among whom were six priests.

had taken place. I ordered him to burn two villages and to shoot the ringle aders, among whom were six priests. This was done, the country was subdued and will remain so for a long time.

A Calabria has revolted, why should you not seize half the estates in the province and give them to your amy!

As the Calabrians have assassinated my soldiers, I will myself issue the decree confiscating, for the benefit of my army, one half of the revenue of the province, both public and private. But if you begin by asserting that Calabria is not in revolt, and that it has always been attached to you, your kindness, or in other words your weakness and timidity will be very mischleyous to France. You are too indulbe very mischievous to France. You are too indul-

St. Cloud, Aug. 1.—I am waiting to hear how man states you have confiscated in Calabria, and ho estates you have confiscated in Calabria, and how many rebels you have executed. You should shoot in every village three of the ringleaders. Do not spare the priests more than the others.

the priests more than the others.

NAPOLEON'S OPINION OF A NATIONAL GUARD.

St. Cloud, Aug. 9, 1806.—My BROTHER: It pains me to see the system which you pursue. What good will fifty thousand armed and trained provincial gnards do? None but to spend your money, to oppose your wishes, and to make all sorts of claims. No system can be more false, or in its ultimate results more fatal. At the first rumor of war on the continent, the men will at the best remain neutral. The officers will negotiate with the great of the part of a battle lest on the the first rumor of war on the continent, the men will at the best remain neutral. The officers will negotiate with the enemy. If they hear of a battle lost on the Isonso or on the Adige, they will turn against you. If I am at peace, or if I conquer, what will you want with them? I should not consider this system without its disadvantages even in France; how much more dangerous will it be in a country whose antipathy toward you can be overcome only by time, only by years! You are too precipitate. Those who surround you have no knowledge of men. You do not listen to a man who has done much, seen much, and thought much. Do not carry out your scheme of a national guard—nothing can be more dangerous. These fellows much. Do not carry out your scheme of a national guard—nothing can be more dangerous. These fellows will get tain and funcy that they are not conquered. No people that has this idea is really subdued. You make me laugh when you say that these men are 50,000 enemies of the Queen. [Joseph had described them as "all proprietors or notoriously enemies of the ex-Queen."] Naples is a country of intriguers, who change with every wind. You exaggerate their hatred to the Queen; you do not know mankind. There are not twenty people who hade her as much as you think, and there are not twenty people who would not yield to one of her smiles—to one of her advances.

what a nation most hates.

(Same letter.)—What a nation most hates is another nation. Your 50,000 men all bate the French. Time, prudence and family alliances can alone bring them together. You raise 50,000 men, and make them think themselves necessary; this is to put yourself in a false nation and to spoil your conquest.

If Italy themselves necessary, this is to put yourselm in a laste position, and to spoil your conquest.

If Italy were once to raise the cry, "Drive the barbarians beyond the Alps!" all your army would abandon you. I wish you to consult me upon all such important matters. It will not do to say that you would take refuge in my camp. An exiled ragrant King is a contemptable being.

NAPOLEON'S OPINION OF TURNCOATS.

(Same letter.)—It is of equal importance that you recall all the diplomatic agents appointed by the late dynasty. It is not right to leave them at their posts; they betray you everywhere; and indeed it is impossible for an honest man to change his colors between morning and evening.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE DISSOLVED.
St. Cloud, Aug. 12.—You are aware that I no longer recognize the German Empire. The Emperor has himself relinquished his title, and keeps only that of Emperor of Austria. The German Princes united under the name of the Confederation of the Rhine, hold at Frankfort an Assembly composed of two Colleges over which the High Chancellor of the Empire is President. I have reserved to myself the right of appointing that functionary. I have assumed the title of Protector of the Confederation.

Munich, Jan. 12, 1806.—Hold no councils of war, but collect opinions one by one.

St. Cloud, Aug. 12, 1806.—I advise you to spend

an hour every morning in reading your returns, in or-der that you may know the position of every part of your army, and that you may recall the portions which are scattered right and left, so as to keep your troops together; for otherwise you cannot be said to have an

Rambowillet, Aug. 20, 1806.-Take pleasure, if you can, in reading your returns. As soon as your troops are collected they will believe in their own strength. That belief will spread through the King-

dom, and will have more infinence than even the ap-

Goin, and win have more induced permane of the troops.

Osterode, March 20, 1807.—Recollect that it takes six campaigns to form the character of a regiment, and that it can be destroyed in one moment.

Finckenstein, May 4, 1807.—I do not value my army by its numbers but by the men of experience and bravery that it contains. The whole army of France is unable to furnish my guard without being somewhat are the light in party. enfes bled in spirit.
Fonto ableau, Oct. 1, 1807.—You do not bestow suffi-

enter bied in spirit.

Fonto alleas. Oct. 1, 1807.—You do not bestow sufficient care and thought on military organization. My armies are large and strong, only because I pay the utmost attention to these details.

St. Cloud, Sept. 15, 1808.—In war spies and information count for nothing. To trust to them is to risk men's lives on trifling grounds.

Faris, March 4, 1807.—Generals are always making fresh demends. It is in the nature of things: there is not one who can be trusted in that respect. It is natural that a man who has only one duty to perform should think only of that; the more troops he has, the more he insures success. It is a great mistake to consider their requests when they cannot be granted.

Schönbrusin, Aug. 21, 1809.—A battle should never he risked unless the chances are seventy per cent in favor of success; in fact, a battle ought always to be

favor of success; in fact, a battle ought always to be the last resource, as from the nature of things its result is always doubtful. But when a battle is resolved on,

is always doubtful. But when a battle is resolved on, one must conquer or perish.

Schonbrunn, Oct. 10, 1809.—Nothing can be more contrary to the rules of war than to publish the strength of your army, either in orders of the day, in preclamations or in newspapers. When you have occasion to speak of your etrength, you ought to render it formidable by exaggerations—doubling or trebling your numbers. On the other hand, when you mention the strength of the enemy, you should dimaish it by one half or one third. In war, moral force is everything.

The most experienced general finds it difficult on the field of battle to estimate the enemy's numbers, and the instinct of every one is to imagine them great-er than they really are. But when a man is so im-prudent as to allow such ideas to circulate generally, and to authorize canggerated accounts of the enemy's numbers, every colonel of eavalry who goes on a re-conneissance sees an army, and every captain of volti-geurs discovers battalians. I say egain—in war, feel-ing and eshion are more than half the reality. When I conquered the Austrians at Eckmuhi I was one to five; and yet my army fancied itself at least equal to I conquered the Austrians at Eckmuhi I was one to five; and yet my suny fancied itself at least equal to the enemy. Constantly in my Italian campaigns, when I had only a hamefull of men, I casegorate their man here; this served my purpose without diminishing my glory. The skill of my operations, including that of exaggerating my strength, was afterward recognized by generals and intelligent officers.

EVERT CONQUERED COUNTRY MUST HAVE ITS REVOLT.

Remboullet. Ann. 17, 1806.—I should like corn.

Remboudled, Aug. 17, 1806.—I should like very much to hear of a result of the Nonpolitan popular. You will never be their master till you have made an example of them. Every conquered country must have its revolt. I should see Naples as result as a father sees his children in the small poor; the crisis is salutary, provided it does not too much weaken the constitution.

Rembowillet, Aug. 20, 1806.—What I tell you is certain; my letters have been quoted in Paris, and I have recognized my own expressions. As you write to me with you own hand, no other person ought to read my letters—you should keep them under lock and key. You are justly reproached with talking too much of your officers, and to too many people.

Sept. 18.—I am in the kabit of meditating for three or four months before kand on the best course to pursive—of calculating on the possibility of the worst. You will therefore do injury to your affairs if you allow what I my pow writing to you to be known.

what I am now wrating to you to be known.

SHOOT AND BURN.

Rombowillet, Aug. 21, 1806.—My BROTHER: I have received your letter of the 12th of August, containing the details of the capture and pillage of the town of Lauria [The town was burned, and the inhabitants were shot as they were trying to escape the flames]. Be sure to order that all the rebellious villages near Euphemia experience the same fate; above all, seize the chiefs.

the chiefs.

THE POLITICS OF EUROPE IN THE AUTUMN OF 1806.

St. Cloud, Sept. 3, 1806.—My BROTHER: I have just received the news that the plans of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg have been altered by the change of musicity, and that the treaty that was concluded on the 20th of June with M. d'Oubril has not been ratified.

* The only reason alleged by the Emperor of Russia was that he would not make peace without England.

St. Cloud, Sept. 12.—Prussia is arming in a most ridiculous manner; however, she will soon disarm, or pay dearly for what she is doing. Nothing can exceed the vacillation of that Cabinet. The Court of Vienna make me great protestations, and its total want of power inclines me to put faith is them. Whatever happens, I can face and will face every enemy. The conscription which I have just ordered is going on in every direction. I am going to call out my reserve [of conscripts, not heretofore called out]. I am indy provided, and in want of nothing. Whether it be war or peace, I shall not diminish your army. In a few days, perhaps, I may put myself at the head of my grand army; it consists of nearly 150,000 men, and with that force I can reduce to submission Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburg.

In the midst of all these everts I do not forget the sea. I have schemes which may, possibly, in a month or two, make me master of the Mediterranean.

Sept. 13.—Prussia makes me a thousand protestations, which do not prevent my taking precautions; in a few days she will have disarmed or she will be crushed. Austria declares her intention to remain neutral. Russia does not know what she wants, but her distance renders her powerless. Such, in two words, is the state of affairs. I fancy that in the course of the next ten days the peace of the continent will be more settled than ever. As to England I can conjecture nothing. Her conduct is decided not by general politics but internal intrigues. The last news announced that Mr.

than ever. As to England 1 can conjecture nothing.

Her conduct is decided not by general politics but internal intrigues. The last news announced that Mr.

For was at the point of death. His friends are deploring his loss as if he were already dead.

Sept. 17.—I have just received the news of the death of Mr. For. Under the present circumstances he dies

regretted by both nations.

Sept. 24.—I start this night for Mayence where I shall arrive on the 28th. shall arrive on the 28th.

Mayence, Oct. 1, 1806.—I am leaving for Wurzburg where I am assembling all my army.

solicy.

St. Cloud, Sept. 12, 1806.—Let your newspapers describe me as occupied in Paris with hunting, amusements, and negotiations. If the warlike preparations of Prussis are mentioned, let it be supposed that they

take place with my consent. take place with my consent.

Sept. 20.— As soon as reports of armaments reach

Naples, announce that all will be settled; and when
you hear of the commencement of hostilities, say that

you hear of the commencement of hostilities, say that I am acting in concert with England to compel Prussia to restore Hanover. As Lord Lauderdale is still in Paris this would not appear improbable.

Bamberg, Oct. 7.—Till the first important news reaches you, spread the report that pance is made, and that an interview has taken place between the two Sovereigns, in which all has been settled. The conduct of Prussia is insane. The war party have gained the upper hand in the Cabinet.

the upper hand in the Cabinet.

THE BATTLE OF JENA AND BERLIN DECREE.

Berlin, Nov. 4, 1806.—The balletins will have informed you of what is going on here. I have taken 120,000 prisoners, park, magazines, baggage, everything has fallen into my power. The three fortresses on the Oder have capitulated. I have completely crushed the power of Prussia. Austria has begun to arm on pretext of protecting her neutrality. We must make corresponding preparations in opper Italy.

Nov. 15.—You will see by the bulletins that our affairs here are prospering; that my army is on the

Nov. 15.—You will see by the bulletins that our affairs here are prospering; that my army is on the Vistula, and that Poland is enthusiastic. The Prussian army and morarchy have censed to exist.

Nov. 16.—The news of what has just happened has thrown London into consternation. The occupation of Hamburg which I have just effected, and the destruction of the blockade of the British islands will increase this uneasiness. It appears that the recent elections have gone against the government.

Posen, Dec. 5.—Anstria has, at my request, dissolved her come of observation, and all inclines me to think

Form, per servation, and all inclines me to think that she wishes to be quiet. I had concluded a truce, but the King of Prussia was unable to ratify it, as he was already in the power of the Russians.

Warsaw, Jan. 30, 1807.—Turkey has declared war

agninet Russin. NAPOLEON CRITICISING THE NEAPOLITAN NEWS

Berlin, Nov. 12, 1806.—Your newspapers contain nothing but petty details of assassinations and mur-ders. This suits admirably the object of our enemies, ders. This suits admirably the object of our enemies, who wish to persuade the world that everything is topsy-turvey in the Kingdom of Naples. Forbid them in future to print anything except what is important. Königsburg, July 12, 1807.—I see in the French papers some letters of King Ferdinand, which have probably been taken from the Neapolitan newspapers. What is the ebject of this? King Ferdinand has a right to defend his throne in every possible way. Why, then, print insignificant letters? Four course is never to speak of him. These disembarcations and incursions of the banditti, which in reality are trifling, are improperly exaggerated. Your Ministers are always eracking their whips; they ought, on the contrary, to make as little as possible of these disturbances, and represent them to the public as even less than they are. This is important.

GENNEAL MACDONALD.

Posen, Dec. 3, 1896.—Mt BROTHER: You require a

Posen, Dec. 3, 1806.—Mr BROTHER: You require a man of ability and energy; I think that Macdonald would suit you. Have a letter written to him at Paris on the subject, and if he consents to enter your service it will be a great advantage to you. You understand that a proposal of this sort must come from you.

[Macdonald was the intimate friend of Moreau. He

[Macdonald was the intimate friend of Moreau. He fell with Moreau and was five years in disgrace.]

Warsow, Jan. 18, 1807.—I see that you do not keep Marshal Messena. You have now with you not one man who has been mixed up in great events. You will want such a man in the Summer. I think, then, that you would do well to ask for the services of Gen. Macdonald and by a direct proposal. [Either the proposal was not made or not accepted. Macdonald was employed by Napoleon himself in the next war against Austria, and after the battle of Warsow was made a Marshall.

Austria, and after the battle of Washall.

A TOUCH OF RUSSIAN WARFARE.

Osterode, March 1, 1807 (three weeks after the battle of Eylan).—I refer you to Cassar Berthier (Joseph had sent Berthier to Napoleon with a statement of the services and losses of the French in Naples, amounting in some regiments to one third, asking for men and promotions as to your comparison of the services of the army of Naples to those of the grand army. Neither the staff, nor the colonels, nor the other regimental officers, have taken their clothes off for the last two months, some not for four months, (I myself have been a fortnight without taking off my boots,) in the middle of snow and mad, without bread, wine, or brandy, living on potatices and meat, making long marches and countermarches without any sort of comfort, fighting with our baronets frequently under graptshot; the entermarches without any sort of comfort, fighting with our bayonets frequently under grapeshot; the wounded obliged to be removed in sledges, in the open air, to a distance of fifty lengues. To compare us with the army of Naples, making war in that beautiful country, where they have bread, wine, oil, linen, sheets to their bees, society, and even women, looks like an attempt at a joke. After having destroyed the Prussians monarchy, we are fighting against the remnant of the Prussians, against Russians, Cossacks and Calmucks, and the tribes of the North, who formarly conquered the Roman Empire. We have war in all its fierceness and all its horrors. In such fatigues every one has been more or less if, except myself, for I never was stronger: I have grown fat. as stronger: I have grown tat.

How to covern the french.

(Same letter.)—Allow no complaining.

French you must show firmness.

THE EXPENSES OF BEING & CONQUEROR.

French you must show firmness.

THE EXPENSES OF BEING A CONQUEROR.

(Same letter.)—The immense levies I am making in France and Italy prevent my sending you money. I have just been forced to spend 12,004,000 france in buying horses, in France. Such a war as I am engaged in consumes both men and materials; immense sams are requisite merely to refind my losses. [The difficulty and cost of feeding Napeleo.'s army in Poland is clearly evinced in the following letter—insto talley-rand, then Minister at Warsaw, dated Osterode, March 12, as d given by Taliers: "I have 300,000 rations of bi-cuit in Warsaw. From Osterode to Warsaw is eight days journey. Do muncles to have sent to me every day 50,000 rations of biscuit and 2,000 pints of brandy. To beat the Russiane, if I have bread, is child's heav. I have milions and am ready to pay. Whatever means you employ I admit to be good!" Eighty wargons a day, which I am willing to pay with their weight in gold, are enough. This matter is more important than all the negotiations in the world. Spend money, I approve of everything. Biscuits and brandy are not that I want. These rations of biscuit and pints

their weight in gold, are enough. This marker is more important than all the negotiations in the world. Spend money. I approve of everything. Biscuits and brandy are all that I want. These rations of biscuit and pints of brandy, if they reach us in a few days, will spoil all the combinations of the hostile powers.

St. Cloud, Aug. 5, 1807.—Take it for a principle that my expenses are enormous.

HOW TO SUPPLY A DEFICIT.

(Some letter.)—On looking at M. Roedeter's report, I am convinced that you have immense respurces. When you have to pay twenty-six millions on account of a national debt, there are at once twenty-six millions to te got by merely stopping payment for one year.

NAPOLEON TOLERATES NO THEORIES BUT HIS OWN.

(Some letter.)—M. Roederer is in a position unfavorable to your interests. He wants to put his theories into execution, and to make himself popular in the country by end-avoring to relieve it.

(Same letter.)—One cannot make a man of imagination like M. Roederer understand that the great art is to be governed by time; that what ought not to be done till 1810 ought not to be done in 1807. The Gallie temper ment cannot submit to wait upon time, and yet it is by deling so that I have cained all my success.

done till 1810 ought not to be done in 1807. The Craine
temperement cannot submit to wait upon time, and yet
it is by doing so that I have gained all my success.
Finckenstein, May 4, 1807.—When a man gets accustomed to affairs, he despises theory, or uses it only
as the geometricians do, not to waik in a mathematically straight line, but to keep in the same direc-

tion.

Transylvania, Oct. 1, 1807.—Your finances are deplorably administered; they are all managed theoretically; but money is eminently a matter of fact.

Dreaden, July 13, 1807.—I look upon men of learning and brilltancy as I do upon coquettes. They are very well to converse with, but we should no more think of taking the former for our ministers than the latter for our wives

DON'T BISORGANIZE MY REGIMENTS Osterode, March, 20, 1807.—It is impossible that you should take conscripts for your guard. [The organization and recruitment of this guard called out many rebukes from Napoleon]. He wrote thus Sept. 18, 1806: Your guard should not be too numerous. It is advisable not to excite the jealousy of the Imperial Guard—3,000 men! my own guard, was no more.]

M. Deliens is not supherized to chapte the destination Guard—3,000 men! my own guard, was no more.]

M. Dejean is not authorized to change the destination of a single conscript.

You have taken the best companies of the cavalry to form your guard, so that the regiments to which they belonged have lost their strength and are no longer of any service. This is the way to make a few men of very little use, and a great many altogether useless. My purpose which I announce to you as Commander in Chief is not to allow even a drummer-boy to leave my regiments without my order.

HOW TO DEAL WITH ECCLESIASTICS.

Finckenticia, April 14, 1907.—I was not very well

Finckenstria, April 14, 1807.—I was not very well pleased with the presmble to the decree suppressing the convents. In what concerns religion, the language employed should be in a religious, not in a philosophical spirit. Why talk of the services which the monks of the bearts and to science? Their merit does not consist in these services, but in the administration of the consolations of religion. The preamble is entirely philosophical, which was not what was wanted. You seem to me to insult those whom you expel. The preamble ought to have been in accordance with the monachal system. You ought to have said that the number of the monks made their subsistence difficult; that the dignity of their profession requires that they should be well supported; that for that purpose, a part must be removed. See People bear injury when unaccompanied by insult, and when the blow does not appear to come from an enemy. Now the enemies of the monachal profession are literary men and philosophers. You know that I am not myself found of them, since I have destroyed them wherever I could.

The Proper Talents of a rules.

THE PROPER TALESTS OF A RULER. (Some letter.)—You should display the talents of a nier, not those of an author or of a man of letters. As a general principle, I distrust a government that deals in the writing.

SEEING DOUBLE.

Osterode, March 1, 1807.—I see from your returns that you have 53,000 men effective, and 43,000 present

under arms.

Fontainehleau, Sept. 1, 1807.—I cannot imagin how you can want such a number of troops in the Kingdom of Naples, which is attacked only by a few wretched banditti. Still less can I understand, unless

it is explained by the theories of your Minister of Fi nance, that with the assistance of the six millions o nance, that with the assistance of the six millions of francs that I sent you, you are not able to pay 25,000 men in a kingdom the population of which amounts to more than four millions. [When Joseph asked for money, Napoleon insisted that he had only 25,000 men; when he asked for men, it was proved to him that he had some 50,008.] That you have no commerce is not a satisfactory reason. If you can give corn, wine and satisfactory reason. If you can give corn, wine and bread to an army, the money required for its pay is trifling. It is true that you export no goods, but also that you export no money. Your finances are generally believed to be horribly ill-managed. Naples costs me an army, and costs me money beside.

AN INFANT SCHOOL FOR TYRANIS.

Finckenstein, May 4, 1807.—In your correspondence with my ministers you must expect to be treated as Commander in-chief of my army, and to hear of my displeasure whenever the rules of administration are not followed. I entreat you to take care of the regiments be onging to the army of Naples, and to keep

ments be onging to the army of Naples, and to keep them in good order. You must resent any chattering or manifestation of discontent. I think that the habit of governing will, with your natural good sense and abilities, strengthen your character and reader you ca-pable of conducting this wast machine if it should be

puble of conducting this wast machine if it should be your lot to survive me.

Prince Jerome is doing well; I am very much pleased with him, and am greatly deceived if there is not stuff in him to make a first-rate man. You may be surve, however, that he has no idea I think so, for in my letters I do nothing but find fault with him. He is adored in Silesia. I placed him there purposely adistant and independent command, because I do not believe in the proverb that it is necessary to know how to obey in orders to know how to command. I am not ill-pleased with Louis: but he is too kind for the dignity of a crown. He does not pay much attention to my advice: nevertheless I continue to give it to him, and experience will soon teach him that much of what he is doing is wrong.

PROGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN WAR AND ITS RESULTS.

April 18, 1807.—We have opened the trenches before Dantzic. April 24.—I devote all my exertions to take that place. May 27.—Dantzic is taken, and I find there immense stores of all descriptions. June 20.

—I am on the Niemen. The battle of Friedland, fought on the anniversary of that of Marengo, has decided the contest. The Russian army has been destroyed. June 27.—I have concluded an armistice with the Emperer of Russia. [The peace of Thisi, by which Napoleon received the greater part of Prussia and Lonian on received the greater part of Prussia and Ionian Islands, with the right of conquering Greece.]

NECESSITY FOR ECONOMY. Fontainbleau, Oct. 21, 1807 .- The necessity of look-

ing carefully to the state of my forces, in order to avoid throwing all my affairs into disorder, required that I should place my army of Naples upon a defining footing, and that I should know that it is well kept up. You may understand the attention which I am obliged to be tow upon these details, when I tell you that I, have more than 800,000 men under arms. You may judge then whether, when all these forces flow back into the interior of my States, and I shall no longer have my aid from without, my expenses must not be calculated with the utmest strictness.

THE MILAN DECREE.

calculated with the utimest strictness.

THE MILAN DECREE.

Turin, Dice. 28, 1807.—I send you a copy of a decree which I have just issued in consequence of the charges in the commerce by sea. I wish it to be executed in your dominious.

Hayoane, April 18, 1808.—Every American ship which enters your ports comes from England; start with this principle, (that is, confiscate it]. England is beginning to suffer. Nothing but peace with that country can make me sheathe the sword and rectore tranquisty to Europe.

NEW CONQUESTS—FORTCGAL, PAPAL STATES AND.

Fontaintleau, Oct. 27, 1807.—I have declared war ranianticus, Oct. 27, 1807.—I have declared was against Portugal; you should, therefore, seize all tag Portuguese vessels which are at present or which any arrive in your harbors. An army of 30,000 men, commanded by Janet, is already on the frontiers of Portugal. I hope to reach Lisbon in November.

Pares, Jan. 20, 1808.—There is no end of the impertmences of the Court of Rome; I am anxious to have none with it. I have distincted its percenticus.

pertinences of the Court of Rome; I am anxious to have come with it. I have dismissed its negotiators.

Modifs will march toward Rome as if he were going to rejoin the army in Naples. When he has reached Rome he will take possession of the castle of St. Angelo, and assume the thir of Commander-ins-Charlof the troops in the Papal States. You feel that this expedition must be kept very secret. I reserve my lurther orders till Modifs arrives at Rome.

Parts, March 5, 180s.—As soon as your troops have embarked for Sielly (there was an effort making for invading Skrity), a large proportion of the troops that I have at Rome will march toward Naples. It is possible that in the course of a week I may start for Spann; the Grand Doke of Berg, Murati, set off a fortingual ago. I have so 000 men at a mistance of

for Spane; the Grand Doke of Berg, [Murat], set off a forthein ago. I have so 000 men at a instance of thirty leagues from Madrit; Junot not's Lisbon and Portugas with 30,000, and yet I have not brought boing one man belonging to the grand army; I have nearly 300,000 in Poisand and on one Oder.

St. Cloud, March 31, 1808.—I will tell you as a secret that my troops entered Madrid on the 24th; thirty King Charles protests against all that has been done him own abdication and Ferdinane's succession]. Ho believes his life in danger and he has implored my protection. Under these circumstances handing.

Bayenne, April 18.—It is not impossible that in the course of two or six days I may write to desire to repair to Dayonne.

Bayonne, May 11.—King Charles by his treaty with me surremotes to me all he rights to the crown of Spain. The Prince had already renounced his 2722 tended title to King, the abdication of King Charles in his favor having been involuntary. This nation, through the Supreme Council of Casine, asks me for a King. I destine this crown for you. Spain is a very different thing from Napice. It contains eleven millions of inhabitants, and has more than 150 millions of revenue, without counting the Indice and the immension revenue to be derived from them. It is, besides, a throne that piaces you at Madrid at three days' journey from France, which borders the woole of one of its frontiers. At Madrid you are in France: Napies is the end of the world. I wish you, therefore, wainediately on the receipt of this letter, to appoint whom you please regent, and to come to Bayonne by way of Turic, Mont Cenis, and Lyons. You will receive this letter on the 19th, you will start on the 20th, and you will be here on the 1st of June.

HOW TO TRICK A FAITHFUL SERVANT.

Bayonne, July 7, 1808.—With regard to Marshall.

Bayenne, July 7, 1808.—With regard to Marshal Jourean, I fear that if I give him such a high title as Duke of Fleurus, with a fortune, [Joseph had asked this for him,] he would want to return to Paris. You should send ter him to Madrid and tell him that I is tend for him one of the ten duchies [he never got any] which I have not yet given away, and in this way gain a few months. He will serve you in Spain, and get used to it.

The Sampards proved still more difficult to man.

The Spantards proved still more difficult to manage than the Neapolitans. Joseph had not been in Madrid twenty days before, in reply to Napoleon's repeated assertions that all the "honest men" were for him, only they were afraid to speak out, he found himself obliged to insist that everybody was against him, and that to save him, fifty thousand good troops and fifty millions in money must be had within three months, of which not the Marshals but he (Joseph) must have the disposal, Soon after be fled from Madrid Napoleon entered Spain with the grand army in November, 1808. Before he left it, on the 19th of January, 1809-for the campaign which terminated at Wagram and resulted in the divorce of Josephine and the marriage of Napoleon with Maria Louisa-the English, under Sir John Moore, had been driven away, and the resistance of the Spaniards reduced to the defense of a few towns and a guerrilla warfare in the southern and western provinces. But while Napoleon was engaged in his cam-

paign against Austria, Sir Arthur Weilesley (the Duke of Wellington) landed in Spain, where new insurrections were organized. In February, 1810, the entire administration of Spain was taken from Joseph except that of Madrid, the civil as well as military authority in the districts held by the French being placed in the hands of the commanding generals. It was in vain that the mortified and miserable Joseph sought permission to retire to private life. No answer was returned to his letters. A journey to Paris with the same object was attended with no better success, and the whole year of 1811 was spent by him in fruitless attempts to escape from his uneasy throne. From Napoleon's letters on Spanish affairs we might, did our space permit, make a number of striking extracts in the ame spirit with his Nespolitan correspondence. The battle of Salsmanca, July 23, 1812, again drove Joseph from Madrid, and the battle of Vittoria, June 20, 1813, ended his nominal reign. Napoleon, meanwhile, has lost his grand army and his prestige in the retreat from Moscow; and soon after, in the battle of Leipsic and the subsequent retreat, he suffered another rout not less disastrous. On bis return to France, he addressed to Joseph, then in retirement at his country-house of Montefoutaine, the following letter, in reply to one in which, while offering his services, he spoke of himself as still having claims to Spain:

December, 1812.—MY BROTHER: I have received your letter of the 29th of December. It is far too clever for the state of my affairs. I will explain it in two words. France is invaded: all Europe is in arms against France, and obose all against me. You are no longer King of Spain. I do not want Spain, either to keep it or to give it away. I will have nothing more to do with that country, except to live it works with it and have the use of my arms. What nothing more to do with that country, except to live in peace with it and have the use of my army. What will you do? Will you, as a French Prince, come to the support of my throne? Are you mable to do this? Have you not good sense enough for it? Then retire to the obscurity of some country-house forty leagues from Paris. You will live there quietly if I live; you will be killed or arrested if I die. You will be useless to me, [me first, of course, I to our family, to your daughters, and to France [France last of sil]; but you will do me no harm and will not be in my way. Choose quickly the line you will take.

Of course Joseph chose, as he always had done, to do just as his brother wished, having (except as to robbing and shooting at his order) always been perfectly his humble servant. He acted as his confidential lieutenant in Paris during the famous campsigns of 1814, which resulted in the entry of the Allies into Paris on the 31st of March, and Napoleon's abdication. The letters written during this period are highly interesting, but related chiefly to military movements. A few letters of little importance written during the Hundred Days close the correspondence, as far as Napoleon is concerned; but the translator has added two curious letters, one from Bertrand giving an account of